

therefore, or the conception of a moral standard, from which the injury that has awakened the resentment is felt to be a deviation. But as nothing ought to form part of a definition which is not indispensable to the thing defined, it would appear, as if, in the judgment of both these philosophers, all who are capable of anger must also have, to a certain degree, a capacity of moral judgment or moral feeling. The property of resenting a hurt inflicted upon ourselves would, at this rate, argue, in all cases, a perception of what the moral and equitable adjustment would be between ourselves and others. Now, that these workings of a moral nature are essential to the feeling of anger, is an idea which admits of most obvious and decisive refutation—it being an emotion to which not only infants are competent, anterior to the first dawning of their moral nature, but even idiots, with whom this nature is obliterated, or still more the inferior animals who want it altogether. There must be a sense of annoyance to originate the feeling; but a sense of injury, implying as it does a power of moral judgment or sensibility, can be in no way indispensable to an emotion, exemplified in its utmost force and intensity by sentient creatures, in whom there cannot be detected even the first rudiments of a moral nature. Two dogs, when fighting for a bone, make as distinct and declared an exhibition of their anger, as two human beings when disputing about the boundary of