

power, without the help of these special affections, could have carried into effect. For there might be a useful economy sanctioned by law, yet which law could not have securely established, unless it had had a foundation in nature. For in this respect there is a limit to the force even of the mightiest despotism—insomuch that the most absolute monarch on the face of the earth must so far conform himself to the indelible human nature of the subjects over whom he proudly bears the sway ; else, in the reaction of their outraged principles and feelings, they would hurl him from his throne. And thus it is well, that, so very generally in the different countries of the world, law, both in her respect for the possessory and acquired rights of property and in her enforcement of them, has, instead of chalking out an arbitrary path for herself, only followed where nature beforehand had pointed the way. It is far better, that, rather than devise a jurisprudence made up of her own capricious inventions—she should, to so great an extent, have but ratified a prior jurisprudence, founded on the original, or at least the universal affections of humanity. We know few things more instructive than a study of the mischievous effects which attend a deviation from this course—of which we at present shall state two remarkable instances. The evils which ensue when law traverses any of those principles that lie deeply seated in the very make and constitution of the