

would put into a state of recoil and restlessness, has no other aim, in the resistance he makes to it, than simply to make full acquittal of his integrity. This is his landing-place; and he looks no farther. There may be a thousand dependent blessings to humanity from the observation of moral rectitude. But the pure and simple appetency for rectitude, rests upon this as its object, without any onward reference to the consequences which shall flow from it. This consideration alone is sufficient to dispose of the system of utility—as being metaphysically incorrect in point of conception, and incorrect in the expression of it. If a man can do virtuously, when not aiming at the useful, and not so much as thinking of it—then to design and execute what is useful, may be and is a virtue; but it is not all virtue.*

8. There is one way in which a theorist may take refuge from this conclusion. It is quite pal-

* If our moral judgment tell that some particular thing is right, without our adverting to its utility—then, though all that we hold to be morally right should be proved by observation to yield the maximum of utility, utility is not on that account the mind's criterion for the rightness of this particular thing. God hath given us the sense of what is right; and he hath besides so ordained the system of things, that what is right is generally that which is most useful—yet in many instances, it is not the perceived usefulness which makes us recognise it to be right. We agree too with Bishop Butler in not venturing to assume that God's sole end in creation was the production of the greatest happiness.