

light of evidence will carry us. And, while we both feel in our own bosoms, and observe in the testimony of those around us, the moral deference which is due to truth and justice—we have not yet detected this to be the same with that deference which we render to the virtue of benevolence. Or, in other words, we do not venerate and regard these as virtues—while, *for aught we know*, the utility of them is not in all our thoughts. We agree with Dugald Stewart in thinking, that, “considerations of utility do not seem to us the only ground of the approbation we bestow on this disposition.” He further observes, that, “abstracted from all regard to consequences, there is something pleasing and amiable in sincerity, openness, and truth; something disagreeable and disgusting in duplicity, equivocation, and falsehood. Dr. Hutcheson himself, the great patron of that theory which resolves all moral qualities into benevolence, confesses this—for he speaks of a *sense* which leads us to approve of veracity, distinct from the sense which approves of qualities useful to mankind.”\*

10. However difficult it may be to resolve the objective question which respects the constitution of virtue in itself—in the subjective question, which respects the constitution of the mind, we cannot but acknowledge the broad and palpable

\* Stewart's "Outlines of Moral Philosophy," Art. Veracity.