

each other.\* For example, there is no such dependence between the colour of a flower and its smell, as that the one can be reasoned from the other; and, in every different specimen therefore, we, to ascertain the two facts of the colour and the smell, must have recourse to two observations. On the other hand, there is such a dependence between the proposition that self-preservation is the strongest and most general law of our nature,

\* See this distinction admirably expounded in Whately's Logic—a work of profound judgment, and which effectually vindicates the honours of a science, that, since the days of Bacon, or rather (which is more recent) since the days of his extravagant because exclusive authority, it has been too much the fashion to depreciate. The author, if I might use the expression without irreverence, has given to Bacon the things which are Bacon's, and to Aristotle the things which are Aristotle's. He has strengthened the pretensions of logic by narrowing them—that is, instead of placing all the intellectual processes under its direction, by assigning to it as its proper subject the art of deduction alone. He has made most correct distinction between the inductive and the logical; and it is by attending to the respective provinces of each, that we come to perceive the incompetency of mere logic for the purpose of discovery strictly so called. The whole chapter on discovery is particularly valuable—leading us clearly to discriminate between that which logic can, and that which it cannot achieve. It is an instrument, not for the discovery of truths properly new, but for the discovery of truths which are enveloped or virtually contained in propositions already known. It instructs but does not inform; and has nought to do in syllogism with the truth of the premises, but only with the truth of the connection between the premises and the conclusion.