

CHAPTER III.

On the Connection between the Intellect and the Will.

1. THERE is distinction made between a mental susceptibility and a mental power. Should we attempt to define it, we might say of the power, that it implies a reference to something consequent, and of the susceptibility that it implies a reference to something antecedent. It is thus that a volition is conceived to indicate the former, and an emotion to indicate the latter. Anger would be spoken of rather as a susceptibility of the mind than as a power; and will, rather as a power than as a susceptibility. We view anger in connection with the provocatives which went before it; and so regarding it as an effect, we conceive of the mind in which this effect has been wrought, as being at the time in a state of subject passiveness. We view the will in connection with the deeds which follow on its determinations; and so, regarding it as a cause, we conceive of the mind when it wills as being in a state of active efficiency. And yet a determination of the will may be viewed not merely as the prior term to the act which flows