

ing; or a tale of distress might be told, which, whether he wills or not, forces from him the tears of sympathy, and sets him as irresistibly on the action of weeping; or, on the appearance of a ferocious animal, he might struggle with all his power for a serene and manly firmness, yet struggle in vain against the action of trembling; or if instead of a formidable a loathsome animal was presented to his notice, he might no more help the action of a violent recoil, perhaps antipathy, against it, than he can help any of the organic necessities of that constitution which has been given to him; or even upon the observation of what is disgusting in the habit or countenance of a fellow-man, he may be overpowered into a sudden and sensitive aversion; and lastly, should some gross and grievous transgression against the decencies of civilised life be practised before him, he might no more be able to stop that rush of blood to the complexion which marks the inward workings of an outraged and offended delicacy, than he is able to alter or suspend the law of its circulation. In each of these cases the action is involuntary; and precisely because it is so, the epithet neither of morally good nor of morally evil can be applied to it. And so of every action that comes thus to speak of its own accord; and not at the will or bidding of the agent. It may be painful to himself. It may also be painful to others. But if it have not had the consent of his will, even that consent without