

which no action that is done can be called voluntary, it is his misfortune, and not his choice; and though not indifferent in regard to its consequences on the happiness of man, yet, merely because disjoined from the will, it in point of moral estimation is an act of the purest indifference.

10. How then, it may be asked, can any moral character be affixed to an emotion, which seems to be an organic or pathological phenomenon, wherewith the will may have little, perhaps nothing to do? Nothing, we have affirmed, is either virtuous or vicious, unless the voluntary in some way intermingles with it; and how then shall we vindicate the moral rank which is commonly assigned to the mere susceptibilities of our nature? We regard compassion as a virtuous sensibility; and we regard malignity, or licentiousness, or envy, as so many depraved affections; and yet, on our principle, they are virtuous or vicious only in so far as they are wilful. It is clearly at the bidding of his will that a man acts with his hand, and therefore we are at no loss to hold him responsible for his doings; but we must learn how it is at the bidding of his will that he feels with his heart, ere we can hold him responsible for his desires. If apart from the will, there be neither moral worth nor moral worthlessness—if it be implied in the very notion of desert that the will has had some concern in that which we thus characterised—if neither actions nor affections are,