

thing different from this object—which respects an act or exercise of the mind, even the attention that we shall give to it. The interest that is felt in any object of thought may have been the cause, and the sole cause of the attention which we give to it. But the necessary connection which obtains between the parts of a process, is no reason why we should overlook any part, or confound the different parts with each other. In this instance, Mr. Hume seems to have observed more accurately than either of the philosophers whom we have now named, when he discriminates between the will and the desire, and tells us of the former, that it exerts itself when the thing desired is to be attained by any action of the *mind* or body. A volition is as distinctly felt in the mental as in the bodily process—although it be in the latter only that the will first acts on some one of the muscles as its instrument, and issues in a visible movement as its required service. The power of the will over an intellectual process is marked by the difference, the palpable difference which there is, between a regulated train of thought and a passive reverie. And there is nothing in the intervention of the will to contravene, or even to modify the general laws of association. Neither does the wish to recover a particular idea, involve in it the incongruity of that idea being both present with and absent from the mind at the same time. We may not have an idea that is absent, and yet have the knowledge of its being