

related to some other idea that is present; and we therefore attend to this latter idea and dwell upon it, for the purpose, as is well expressed by Mr. Mill, of "giving it the opportunity of exciting all the ideas with which it is associated; for by not attending to it, we deprive it more or less of that opportunity." It is, therefore, as he elsewhere expresses it, that we detain certain ideas and suffer others to pass. But there is nothing inconsistent with the laws of phenomena of association, in our saying of this act of detention that it is a voluntary act—that we detain certain ideas, because we will to detain them.*

19. It is this which imparts virtuousness to emotion, even though there be nothing virtuous which is not voluntary. It is true that once the idea of an object is in the mind, its counterpart emotion may, by an organic or pathological law, have come unbidden into the heart. The emotion may have come unbidden; but the idea may not have come unbidden. By an act of the will, it may, in the way now explained, have been summoned at the first into the mind's presence; and at all events it is by a continuous act of the will that it is detained and dwelt upon. The will is not in contact with the emotion, but it is in contact with that idea of the object which awakens

* See the Chapter on the Will in Mill's *Analysis of the Human Mind*.