

fancy the licentious image, or turning our sight and our eyes from viewing vanity. It is this command of the will over the attention, which, transmuting the intellectual into the moral, makes duties of heedfulness and consideration—and duties too of prime importance, because of the place which attention occupies in the mental system, as the great ligament between the percipient and the pathematic parts of our nature. It is by its means that the will is made to touch at least the springs of emotion—if it do not touch the emotions themselves. The will tells on the sensibilities, through an intermediate machinery which has been placed at its disposal; and thus it is, that the culture or regulation of the heart is mainly dependent on the regulation of the thoughts.

20. We may thus be enabled to explain, and perhaps more clearly than before, the force and inveteracy of habit; and that, not by the power of emotions to suggest emotions, but purely by the power of thoughts to suggest thoughts. In this process, the emotions will of course intermingle with their own counterpart thoughts; and both ideas and feelings will succeed each other in their customary trains all the more surely, the oftener it has been suffered to pass unbroken by any intervention of the will, any remonstrance from the voice of conscience. It is in this way that the wretched voluptuary becomes every year the more helpless victim of his own depraved inclinations—