

states. The imagination that there is neither moral worth nor moral delinquency in the state of a man's belief, proceeds on the voluntary having had no share in the process which leads to it. Now, through the intermedium of the very same faculty, the faculty of attention, the will stands related to the ultimate convictions of the understanding, precisely as it stands related to the ultimate emotions of the heart. It is true that as the object in view of the mind is, so the emotion is. And it is as true that as the evidence in view of the mind is, so the belief is. In neither case has the will to do with the concluding sequence; but in both cases it has equally to do with the sequences that went before it. There may be a pathological necessity beyond our control, in that final step of the succession, which connects the object that is perceived with its counterpart emotion, or the evidence that is perceived with its counterpart belief. But in like manner as it is by the attention, which we might or might not have exercised, that the object is perceived by us, so is it by the attention, which we might or might not have exercised, that the evidence is perceived by us. It is thus that on innumerable questions, and these of vital importance, both to the present wellbeing and the future prospects of humanity, the moral may have had causal antecedency over the intellectual; and the state of a man's creed may depend on the prior state of his character. We have already seen how