

the possibility of this, had it been so provided. We see the young of some creatures with their vision thus perfect at the moment of their birth. But in these animals, every corresponding faculty is, in the same manner, perfect from the beginning: the dropped foal, or the lamb, rises and follows its mother. We must no more compare the helpless human offspring with the young of these animals than with a fly, the existence of which is limited to an hour at noon,—which breaking from its confinement, knows its mate and deposits its eggs on the appropriate tree—the willow or the thorn, and dies. But this is foreign to our enquiry; since it is obvious that the human eye has no such original power of vision bestowed upon it, and that it is acquired, as the exercise of the other senses, and the faculties of the mind itself are, by repeated efforts, or experience.

If it be admitted that the ideas which we receive through the eye come by experience, we must allow that the mind must be exercised in the act of comparison, before we can have a conception of any thing being exterior to the eye, or of an object being placed in a particular direction. Authors make the matter complex by conceiving a picture to be drawn at the bottom of the eye, and presenting to us the mind contemplating this inverted picture, and comparing the parts of it. But this leaves