

and making them communicate, when a pungent and disagreeable metallic taste is instantly perceived: this happens because the nerves of the tongue, being acted upon by the galvanism thus excited, communicate the same sensation as that which would be occasioned by the actual application of sapid bodies to that organ. Thus, it appears that causes which are very different in their nature, may, by acting on the same nerves, produce the very same sensation; and it follows, therefore, that our sensations cannot be depended upon as being always exactly correspondent with the qualities of the external agent which excites them.

Evidence to the same effect may also be gathered from the consideration of the narrowness of those limits within which all our senses are restricted. It requires a certain intensity in the agent, whether it be light, or sound, or chemical substances applied to the senses of smell or taste, in order to produce the very lowest degree of sensation. On the other hand, when their intensity exceeds a certain limit, the nature of the sensation changes, and becomes one of pain. Of the sensations commonly referred to the sense of touch, there are many which convey no perception of the cause producing them. Thus, a slighter impression than that which gives the feeling of resistance produces the sensation of itching, which is totally different in its kind. The sensation of cold is equally positive with that of warmth, and differs from it, not in degree merely, but in species; although we know that it is only in its degree that the external cause of each of these sensations differs.

The only distinct notions we are capable of forming respecting *Matter*, are that it consists of certain powers of attraction and repulsion, occupying certain portions of space, and capable of moving in space; and that its parts thereby assume different relative positions or configurations. But of *mind*, our knowledge is more extensive and more precise, because we are conscious of its existence, and of many of its operations, which are comprised in the general term *thought*. To assert that thought can be a property of mat-