

est des substances auxquelles on donne le nom de matière, telle que la matière éthérée, et qui sont d'une si inconceivable tenuité, qu'on diroit qu'elles tiennent *le milieu entre l'esprit et la matière.*" Sir Humphry Davy seems to have adopted a similar opinion, which I have given in another part of this work;* and Dr. Wollaston also, in his *Religion of Nature Delineated*, asks—" Might it not be more reasonable to say *it* (the soul) *is a thinking substance intimately united to some fine material vehicle which has its residence in the brain?*"† And again—" If we should suppose the soul to be a being by nature made to inform some body, and that it cannot exist and act in a state of *total separation* from all body; it would not follow from thence, that what we call death must therefore reduce it to a state of absolute insensibility and inactivity, which to it would be equal to non-existence. For that body, which is so necessary to it, may be some fine vehicle that dwells with it in the brain, and goes off with it at death.‡ This vehicle, which is so necessary to the soul, dwells with it in the brain, and goes off with it at death, he further supposes, is that by which it acts and is acted upon, by means of the nerves.§ This vehicle seems not very different from the *vital powers* of modern physiologists, who regard the nervous power as their agent.||

The doctrine of a vehicle for the soul, which accompanies her when separated from the body, is not a modern hypothesis, but was held by the Platonists and many of the fathers.¶

Our Lord says to his disciples—*The hairs of your head*

* See vol. ii. chap. xviii.

† P. 192.

‡ Ibid. 196.

§ Ibid. 197.

|| Dr. Wilson Philip, in *Philos. Tr.* 1829, 271, 278.

¶ See Dr. H. More, *On the Immortality of the Soul*, B. iii. Axiome xxvii. and Cudworth's *Intellectual Syst.* 799.