

good sense as he had genius; and it is only where ordinary means are evidently insufficient to account for any fact, that we are at liberty to ascribe it to the extraordinary interposition of the Deity; or to any *intermediate* supernatural agency employed by him to produce it: and no class of facts so loudly proclaim their Great Author as those which are the result of the nice balancing of conflicting energies and operations observable in the different departments of the animal kingdom.

We may observe, however, that when our Saviour says to his disciples concerning sparrows—*One of them shall not fall to the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered;*\*—the observation implies that nothing escapes the notice, or is too mean, or insignificant, to be below the attention and care of Him who is all eye, all ear, all intellect; who directeth all things to answer his purposes, *according to the good pleasure of his will,*† which is the universal good of his creatures.

Having premised these general observations, I shall now proceed to inquire into the proximate cause of instinct; admitting, as proved, that every kind of instinct has its origin in the will of the Deity, and that the animal exhibiting it was expressly organized by Him for it at its creation.

The proximate cause of instinct must be either metaphysical or physical, or a compound of both characters.

1. If *metaphysical*, it must either be the *immediate* action of the Deity, or the action of some *intermediate* intelligence employed by him, or the *intellect* of the animal exhibiting it.

2. If *physical*, it must be the action or stimulus of some physical power or agent employed by the Deity, and under his guidance, so as to work His will upon the organization

\* Matt. x. 29, 30.

† Ephes. i. 5.