

her lading of nectar and ambrosia, she returns to the common habitation of her people, with whom she unites in labours before described,* for the general benefit of the community to which she belongs.

More reasons might be adduced to prove that intellect is not the great principle of instinct, but enough seems to have been said to establish that point. It should be borne in mind, however, that though intellect is not the great principle, yet it must be admitted that all animals gifted with the ordinary organs of sensation, more or less employ their intellect in the whole routine of their instinctive operations, as I shall show under another head.

2. But if no metaphysical power can be satisfactorily demonstrated to be the immediate cause of instinct, then it seems to follow that it must be either a physical one, or one partly physical and partly metaphysical.

In the former case, it must be the action of some physical power or agent, employed by the Deity, and under his guidance so as to work his will, upon the organization of the animal; which must be so constructed as to respond to that action in a certain way, or by the exhibition of certain phenomena peculiar to the individual genus or species.

Mr. Addison has observed—"There is not, in my opinion, anything more mysterious in nature than this instinct in animals, which thus rises above reason, and falls infinitely short of it. It cannot be accounted for by any properties in matter, and at the same time works after so odd a manner, that one cannot think it the faculty of an intelligent being. For my own part, I look upon it as upon the principle of *gravitation* in bodies, which is not to be explained by any known qualities inherent in the bodies themselves, nor from any laws of mechanism, but according

* See above, p. 138, and Introd. to Ent. ii. 173.