

voured to be experimentally proved, that these nervous powers are identical with the powers of electricity. It is impossible to imagine a greater fallacy. Admitting that electricity, properly directed, could change the proximate elements of the food into those of chyle; can we imagine electricity to vary spontaneously its mode of operation, so as to produce the same chyle from every sort of aliment—that electricity is an *intelligent* agency acting with a certain object? Besides, if the nervous agency be identical with electricity in one set of nerves, it must be more or less identical with electricity in all; for though powers of a higher order may be imagined to reside in different classes of nerves, the whole nervous system must be supposed to possess, in common, certain other powers, analogous to, if not identical with, the inferior power residing in the ganglionic nerves: otherwise that free communication, so plainly indicated by the structure, could not be supposed to take place among the different parts of the nervous system. Now, on the supposition that the inferior power residing in the nervous system, be identical with electricity, how different must be the functions of that agency in the different classes of nerves; in one class of nerves, for example, digesting and assimilating the food; in another class helping to convey sight or sound; in the brain itself, shall we say, actually thinking, or at least conveying thought! As to the experiments, on