

were acquainted; to it they attributed the effects of others, and all the phenomena of the universe. If this idea of theirs had been probable, or even possible, impulsion, which they regarded as the sole cause, must have been a general effect, which equally belonged to all matter, and which equally exerted itself in all places, and at all times; but every day demonstrated the contrary to be the fact; for they must have perceived that this force had no existence in bodies at rest; that it had but a short subsistence in projected bodies, being soon destroyed by resistance; that a fresh impulse was absolutely necessary for its renewal, and that, consequently, so far from being a general cause, it was only a particular effect produced by others more general.

It is true, however, that we ought to consider a general effect as a cause, for we cannot become acquainted with the real cause of this effect, because all our knowledge is derived from comparison; and as there is not any thing to which we can compare an effect, which is supposed general, and equally belonging to every thing, we can know it only by the fact. According to this view, attraction, or gravity, being a general effect common to all matter, and clearly evinced by the fact,

ought