

divisibility, and the communication of movement by impulsion, by elasticity, &c. The particular ideas of each of these qualities we have acquired by our senses, and regard them as principles, because they are general and belong to all matter. But are we certain these qualities are the only ones which matter possesses, or rather, must we not think these qualities, which we take for principles, are only modes of perception; and that if our senses were differently formed, we should discover in matter, qualities different from those which we have enumerated? To admit only those qualities to matter which are known to us, seems to be a vain and unfounded pretension. Matter may have many general qualities which we shall ever be ignorant of; she may also have others that human assiduity may discover, in the same manner as has recently been done with respect to gravity, which alike exists in all matter. The cause of impulsion, and such other mechanical principles, will always be as impossible to find out as that of attraction, or such other general quality. From hence is it not very reasonable to say, that mechanical principles are nothing but general effects, which