

which it has experienced by the presence of the same objects, does it not lead to a belief, that the presence of objects is not necessary to the existence of our sensations ; and that, of consequence, our mind and body may exist independent of those objects ? During sleep, and after death, for example, our body has the same existence as before ; yet the mind no longer perceives this existence, and the body with regard to us, has ceased to be. The question is therefore, whether a thing which can exist, and afterwards be no more, and which affects us in a manner altogether different from what it is, or what it has been, may yet be a reality of indubitable existence.

That something exists without us, we may believe, though not with a positive assurance ; whereas of the real existence of every thing within us, we have a certainty. That of our soul, therefore, is incontestable, and that of our body seems doubtful ; because the mind has one mode of perception when we are awake, and another when we are asleep ; after death, it will perceive by a method still more different, and the objects of its sensations, or matter in general, may then cease to exist with respect to  
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