thing in common with our species but the matter which forms our body, and in which our resemblance to brute animals is confined.

Were internal sensations dependent on corporeal organs, should we not see as remarkable difference in the works of animals of the same species as in those of men? Would not those which were the most happily organized, build their nests and contrive their cells in a manner more solid, elegant, and commodious? And if any individual possessed a superior genius, would it not take an opportunity to manifest that superiority in its actions? But nothing of this kind has ever happened, and therefore the corporeal organs, however perfect or imperfect, have no influence on the nature of the internal sensations. Hence we may conclude, that animals have no sensations of this kind; that such sensations have no connection with matter, no dependence in their nature on the texture of corporcal organs, and that of consequence there must be a substance in man different from matter, which is the subject and the cause that produces and receives those sensations.

But these proofs of the immateriality of the human mind may be carried still farther. In