

added to the senses of taste and feeling, that it will actually advance or recede from objects which become relative to its appetite. A dog, for instance, who has been tutored, however violent his appetite, will not seize what might satisfy that appetite, although he will use every gesture to obtain it from the hand of its master. Does not this animal seem to reason between desire and fear, nearly as a man would do, who was inclined to seize upon the property of another, but was withheld by the dread of punishment? Though this analogy may be just; yet to render it in effect well-founded, should not animals be capable of performing the same actions that we perform? Now the contrary is evident; as nothing do animals either invent or perfect; in every thing they have an uniformity, and consequently no reflection. Of this analogy then we may doubt its reality, and may with propriety enquire, whether it is not by a principle different from ours that brutes are directed? and whether, without being under the necessity of allowing them the aid of reflection, the senses they enjoy are not sufficient to produce the actions they perform?

Whatever relates to their appetites strongly agitates their interior sense; and on the object of this appetite the dog would instantly rush,
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