

May we not conceive what this consciousness of existence is in animals, by reflecting on our own state when strongly occupied with some object, or violently agitated by some passion, which banishes every reflection upon self? This state we familiarly express by saying, the man is absent or beside himself; and people are in reality beside themselves, when they are occupied with sensations actually present to them, especially if those sensations are so violent and rapid as to allow the mind no time for reflection. When thus situated we feel pleasure and pain in all their varieties; therefore, though seemingly without the participation of the mind, we have a consciousness of our existence. This state, to which we are occasionally exposed, is the habitual state of animals; deprived of ideas, and furnished with sensations, they *know* not their existence but *feel* it.

To render more sensible this difference, let us consider minutely the faculties of brutes, and compare them with the actions of man. Like us they have senses, and receive impressions from exterior objects; they have also an interior sense, an organ which retains the agitations occasioned by those impressions, and consequently sensations which, like ours, are

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