

do not entirely agree with the animal in question, and therefore as it perfectly resembles the common otter in other respects, I judged that it was not a particular species, but only a simple variety ; and as the Greeks, especially Aristotle, have taken great care not to give different names, except to distinct species, we are therefore convinced that the *latax* is another animal. Besides, as the otters, like the beavers, are commonly larger, and their hair finer, and of a more beautiful black in America than in Europe ; this Canadian otter ought, in fact, to be larger and blacker than our otter. But in attempting to discover what the *latax* of Aristotle might be, I conjectured that it was the same animal as Belon calls the *marine wolf*.

Aristotle mentions six amphibious animals, of which only three are known to us, namely, the seal, the beaver, and the otter ; the three others, the *latax*, the *satherion*, and the *satyrion*, still remain unknown, because their names are only mentioned without any description of them. In this case, as in all those where we cannot draw any direct induction from a knowledge of the object, we must have recourse to the mode of exclusion : but we cannot make use of that mode with any success, unless we
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