

greatest mistakes and imperfections of his system, and the strange omission of many of the highest faculties of our nature. Of the imaginative powers he hardly says one word, or speaks of them only to condemn them. Yet are they so woven into our nature that they mingle themselves with almost every word and deed—aid us in the interchange of thought—ever give delight, in their exercise, both to savage and civilized man—nor can they for a moment be put off, except by an effort of the mind, in the severe abstractions of exact science. For a metaphysician to discard these powers from his system, is to shut his eyes to the loftiest qualities of the soul, and is as unaccountable as it would be for a physiologist to overlook the very integuments of our animal frame.

It is by the imagination, more perhaps than by any other faculty of the soul, that man is raised above the condition of a beast. Beasts have senses in common with ourselves, and often in higher perfection: to a certain extent also they possess, I think, the powers of abstraction, though this is denied by Locke; but of the imaginative powers, they offer perhaps no single trace. These high

into his strange paradox respecting personal identity. Consciousness (in the sense in which he uses the word) is the proof of our own identity to ourselves; and it is through this principle, in our nature, that we know that we continue one and the same being, and feel that we are personally responsible for our past actions. Remembering or associating the past with the present is one of the faculties of a rational being. But the individual mind existed anterior to the manifestation of this faculty; otherwise there is no common connecting principle among our thoughts, and no such thing as personal identity. In the chapter on "our ideas of substances," he considers a "spiritual substance as the *substratum* of those simple ideas we have from without;" and he justly discriminates between the soul itself and the manifestation of its powers. His distinction is well drawn; but it is, I think, at variance with his discussion on personal identity.