

is all truth demonstrative: and one fault of the Essay of Locke is its attempt to extend too far the boundaries of demonstration. It would indeed be as absurd to apply imaginative language to the demonstrations of pure reason, as to apply the language of demonstration to the analysis of ideal beauty. Each faculty must have its proper place; but none can be lopped off without marring the handy-work of God.

If it be demanded what is the office of the imagination? we may reply that its office consists in its appropriate exercise conjointly with every other faculty of the soul. In one respect, however, its use, as well as its abuse, is so obvious as to deserve a formal notice. Men decide not on reason only—incline not naturally to the right side, like the scale of a balance, by the mere weight of evidence. They act in common cases through habit or affection; and in trying circumstances the determination of the will is often more by feeling than by reason. Hence the imaginative powers, in kindling up the active feelings of the soul, have ever been mighty instruments of persuasion, whether for good or for evil. When Demosthenes, in pleading before the Athenian multitude, swore by the souls of his fellow-countrymen who had periled their lives in battle on the field of Marathon—and when St Paul, speaking in the presence of King Agrippa, held up his hand before the assembled crowd and wished to God that every one of them was not only almost but altogether as himself excepting his bonds—each spoke from the momentary fulness of his own feeling—each spoke to the hearts and bosoms of those around him; and put forth a weapon of persuasion a thousand