

quiry. One cause of this may be, that it takes place more by passion and affection than by reason; and we should be almost justified in affirming, that the will is never determined by reason only, unless some affection be superadded*. But this destroys

* Locke affirms (*Essay on the Human Understanding*, Book II. chap. 21.) that "the motive for continuing in the same state of action, is only the present satisfaction in it: the motive to change, is always some uneasiness:" and consistently with this opinion he goes on to state, "that the most pressing uneasiness naturally determines the will, when man is distracted with different desires." Here is a fallacy of like kind with that which has led men to resolve all motives into selfishness. Uneasiness, mental or bodily, is a *powerful motive* in determining the will, but it is not the *only motive*. The passion of maternal love which urges a mother to caress and protect her child, is surely a feeling very different from the pain which induces a child to withdraw its finger from the flame of a candle. To describe the two feelings by the same term *uneasiness*, tends only to confusion both of thought and word. If the doctrine of Locke be true, a man is in a state of absolute moral necessity—a conclusion, I think, directly contrary to reason and to our own experience.—Again; the doctrine, even in extreme cases, is not true. A man of courage will sometimes endure the protracted torture of a surgical operation without flinching. But no one will, surely, say, that the remembrance of past suffering, or the hope of future good, is at the moment a more intense uneasiness than the pain inflicted by the surgeon's knife. In such a case the will is determined by the hope of future good, and directly against the impulse of present uneasiness.

Locke saw clearly that the will is not generally determined by reason, pointing out to us the greatest positive good: and he was thence led to the theory above stated; which, however inadequate to explain all the active principles of our nature, has in it much truth; and ought to have modified several of the opinions advanced in the latter part of his work, (Book IV. Chap. 17, 18, 19.) Describing the different grounds of assent, he well distinguishes reason and faith from each other. "Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties. Revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately; which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives that they come from God." Faith, according to the same author, is the assent to any proposition, coming directly from God in the way of revelation. But he forgets that religion is a rule of
life,