

between man and man. Many of our duties in society are artificial, and can only be ascertained by usage or positive enactment. But on questions of moral right, not only are the Scriptures the supreme authority in all cases where they contain specific declarations; but their maxims are ever directed through the affections to the moral sense; and I believe that any man who has studied them, and honestly acts upon their principles, is a thousand times more likely to determine rightly on any difficult moral point, than one who interrupts all the movements of his moral sense, and resolves not to decide till he has calculated the chances of utility.

3. Having already considered the argument by which Paley rejects the moral sense, I need not repeat what is stated in the preceding discourse, (p. 58, &c.) His conclusion is, I think, false; and his reasoning is of no weight, except for the intent of shewing the feeble sanction of mere moral rule.

In the ordinary course of life, men act through passion, affection, or habit. A good system of moral philosophy ought to analyze the active principles of our nature, and then shew their bearing on moral duties, and their subordination to the faculty whereby men know right from wrong. It may deal in general rules: but its rules are worse than nothing if not constructed with immediate reference to our moral capacities—in one word, if they do not ultimately rest on the supremacy of conscience. A system that defines moral right by the standard of worldly utility, not merely leaves out of account the best active principles of our nature; but makes them worse