

place of cause—to look only to the worldly effects of actions, and overlook their principles. Such a system places us in a false position, supposes us gifted with a power of tracing consequences which belongs not to our nature, blunts our perceptions of moral truth, and leads many men to make a wreck both of common principle and common sense. In natural history and natural philosophy, we see beautiful examples of contrivance and adaptation. But who would ever think of making contrivance the first principle of arrangement in natural history; or adaptation, the foundation of physical science? In these sciences, at least, all men have acknowledged the necessity of separating primary cause from secondary consequence. And why should they not be bound by the same principles in moral reasoning?

6. In despite of a bad system, Paley was saved, by the rules he derived from Scripture (as well as by extraordinary good sense, and the kind feelings of his moral nature), from many great mistakes in the application of his principles. Sometimes, however, his system led him to play into the hands of bad men; and to take low grounds of reasoning, but ill suited to the high tone of a christian moralist. I will not dwell at any length on examples of this kind: but it is important for my present object to point out some of them.

(1) The first example of the base conclusions of a utilitarian system of morals, occurs among the practical observations in the chapter on Virtue. It is only necessary in this place to request the reader to reperuse the remarks at p. 67 of this Discourse, as well as the note affixed to it.

(2) A most offensive instance of sacrificing common honesty and common sense, to nothing