

the other hand, new inclinations and new capacities for virtue. The mind becomes stored with remembrance of moral victories; the associating principle is then the source of happy recollections and good resolves; and above all, the soul is taught to seek for strength where it is to be found—in the fountain of all goodness. And thus a good man learns, at length, to do without effort, and with inward joy, what another, were he to give the whole world for the power, has no possibility of performing.

If such be the conditions of our being, and such the relations of our thoughts to the things around us, a good training and the commencement of good habits in early life must be matters of inexpressible moment. This is equally true whether, according to the bent of our minds, the question be considered in a metaphysical or a religious point of view. The remark is by no means confined to our intellectual capacities—It applies with fuller meaning to our moral and religious sentiments—to all those feelings of the soul which call our moral powers into visible activity. A philosopher may be cold-hearted and irreligious—a moralist may be without benevolence—and a theologian may be wanting in the common charities of life. All this shews that knowledge is not enough, unless feelings and habits go along with it, to give it its meaning, and to carry it into practical effect. Religion reaches the fountain-head of all these evils; and she alone gives us an antagonist principle whereby we may effectually resist them.

In natural knowledge we may mount from phenomena to laws; but in doing this we are held by fetters we cannot break—we cannot alter one link in the chain of natural causes—we can only mark the traces of an unvarying power, external to ourselves,