

have desired, but only permitted in virtue of its connexion with that which as a being of supreme benevolence he could not but desire—even the greatest possible amount of good. The *voluntas decretoria* then in virtue of which evil exists, is compatible with the *voluntas inclinatoria*—in virtue of which God desires that evil may be combated, may be overcome, may be destroyed; and that all the energies of moral nature may be aroused to the uttermost against it. Our business, whether as ministers or men, is not with the *voluntas decretoria*, but to carry into effect the designs of the *voluntas inclinatoria*—or, in other words, to enter on a war of extermination with all evil whether physical or moral, to allay suffering to the uttermost and resist sin to the uttermost. Under the system of Leibnitz, which for aught we know may be true, there is room both for a *voluntas decretoria* that has originated or rather permitted the evil, and for an honest *voluntas inclinatoria* bent on the extinction of it. How honest in his opinion this last will is, Leibnitz expresses in the following sentence: “*Quam seria autem hæc voluntas sit Deus ipse declaravit cum tanta asseveratione dixit—nolle mortem peccatoris, velle omnes salvos, odisse peccatum.*” “How sincere this will is, God himself hath declared when He said with such asseveration that He willed not the death of sinners, that He willed all men to be saved, that He hated sin!” Our business then is to act as fellow-workers with God, in being the ministers of his *voluntas inclinatoria*; and to feel that we enlist in His cause, when we enlist in opposition to moral evil.