

balls; and each collision would constitute events as distinct and as certainly foreseen and determined upon as the final one. But they might not accomplish any specific object, and be merely incidental to such a system of moving bodies. God might, indeed, in infinite wisdom, make them subservient to other objects besides the ultimate one; but they might be mere incidental occurrences in such a system, which even Omnipotence could not prevent without altering the system.

Now, have we not here two classes of events, equally the result of divine power and wisdom? Yet one of them is special, and accomplishes a definite object; the other is merely incidental, and may or may not be used for a special purpose. Just so can we see how the special providence of God may be distinct from common providence, although both are equally the work of God. He has so arranged the agencies of his government, that certain specific objects shall be accomplished infallibly. But through the operation of those agencies a multitude of other events are brought about incidentally, which, although related to special providences, are not such in themselves.

Another inquiry may arise in reference to some of the preceding reasoning. We have endeavored to show that special providences may be the result of an original adjustment of the agencies of the natural and moral world, or of direct interposition by the Deity out of sight in modifying those agencies. Now, the question is, Which of these methods is actually employed in the divine government? Can we determine which? If by special interposition at the moment, is not the evidence of such interposition precluded by the very supposition we have made? For the statement is, that the interposition must be made out of our sight; while within view, the event seems to be brought about by the ordinary