the existing processes and races had a beginning. But this the atheist denies, as we have already seen, and not without some degree of plausibility. Yet in man's creation we have a work demanding an infinite Deity, accomplished within a definite period. It is not, indeed, the original creation of matter, but rather its re-creation, with the bestowment of the higher principles of life and intellect. It may be regarded, therefore, as a new argument for the divine existence, or rather, perhaps, the old argument cleared of every difficulty, and having the freshness and transparency of demonstration.

My fourth inference derives from the subject a refutation of the wide-spread doctrine of creation by law, and of the unmiraculous development of the higher from the lower forms of organic life.

This hypothesis, though old as Democritus, and finding a lodgment occasionally in the brain of here and there a cloistered sceptic, has never till our day assumed a popular dress, and ventured forth to gain the attention of the crowd, and become the theme of discussion in the place of public resort, and even by the fireside of private life. La Place first attempted to show how suns and systems might be formed from eternal matter in a nebulous state without a Deity. Next, the French naturalists, improving upon Democritus, described the process by which inorganic matter became organic, in the lowest and simplest degree; and, finally, with the aid of Anglo-Saxon sceptics, they traced the development of the vital particle called a monad in its upward progress, through higher and higher tribes of animals, till, finally, even man was evolved from the quadrumana, by what was called "a tendency to improvement" and "the force of circumstances." And all these changes depended, not upon miraculous intervention, but upon the operation of laws eternally inherent in

