

shaded one ; and, addressing the strongly marked floras on either hand, even more sternly than the waves themselves, demands that to a certain definite bourne should they come, and no farther.

But in what form, it may be asked, or with what limitations, ought the Christian controversialist to avail himself, in this question, of the experience argument? Much ought to depend, I reply, on the position taken up by the opposite side. We find no direct reference made by the author of the "Vestiges" to the anti-miracle argument, first broached by Hume, in a purely metaphysical shape, in his well-known "Inquiry," and afterwards thrown into the algebraic form by La Place, in his *Essai philosophique sur les Probabilités*. But we do not detect its influences operative throughout the entire work. It is because of some felt impracticability on the part of its author, of attaining to the prevailing belief in the *miracle* of creation, that he has recourse, instead, to the so-called *law* of development. The *law* and the *miracle* are the alternatives placed before him ; and, rejecting the *miracle*, he closes with the *law*. Now, in such circumstances, he can have no more cause of complaint, if, presenting him with the experience argument of Hume and La Place, we demand that he square the evidence regarding the existence of his *law* strictly according to its requirements, than the soldier of an army that charged its field-pieces with rusty nails would have cause of complaint if he found himself wounded by a missile of a similar kind, sent against him by the artillery of the enemy. You cannot, it might be fairly said, in addressing him, acquiesce in the *miracle* here, because, as a violation of the laws of nature, there are certain objections, founded on invariable experience, which bear direct against your belief in it. Well, here are the objections, in the strongest form in which they