

power, and that it could have done greatly more than it actually did, seeing that we now find it to be a Cause adequate to the origination of vitality and organization in two great types,—the vegetable and the animal,—as exemplified in pines and araucarians, in fishes and in reptiles. But still confining ourselves with cautious skepticism within the limits of our argument, we continue to hold that, as fishes of a high, and reptiles of a low order, with trees of the cone-bearing family, are the most perfect specimens of their respective classes which the producing Cause has originated, it would be unphilosophic to hold, in the absence of proof, that it would originate aught higher or more perfect. And now, as yet other ages pass away, the creation of the great Secondary division takes the place of the vanished Palæozoic; and we find in its few dicotyledonous plants, in its reptiles of highest standing, and in its some two or three comparatively humble mammals, that in the previous, as in the earlier creation, the producing Cause had been, if I may so express myself, working greatly under its strength, and that in this third creation we have a still higher display of its potency. With some misgivings, however, we again apply our argument. And now yet another creation,—that of the Tertiary period, with its noble forests of dicotyledonous trees, and its sagacious and gigantic mammals,—rises upon the scene; and, as our experience in creation has now become very considerable indeed, and as we have seen each in succession higher than that which preceded it, we find that, notwithstanding our assumed skepticism, we had,—compelled by one of the most deeply-seated instincts of our nature,—been secretly anticipating the advance which the new state of things actually realizes. But, applying the argument yet once more, we at least assume to hold, that as the sagacious elephant is the highest example of animal life produced by the originating Cause, it would be unphilosophic to