

deem it capable of producing a higher example ; and, while we are thus reasoning, man appears upon creation, — a creature immeasurably superior to all the others, and whose very nature it is to make use of his experience of the past for his guidance in the future. And if that only be solid experience or just reasoning which enables man truly to anticipate the events which are to come, and so to make provision for them, and if that experience be not solid, and that reasoning not just, which would serve but to darken his discernment, and prevent him from correctly predicating the cast and complexion of coming events, what ought to be his decision regarding an argument which, had it been employed in each of the vanished creations of the past, would have had but the effect of arresting all just anticipation regarding the creation immediately succeeding, and which, thus reversing the main end and object of philosophy, would render the philosopher who clung to it less sagacious in divining the future than even the ordinary man? But, in truth, the existing premises, wholly altered by geologic science, are no longer those of Hume. The foot-print of his unhappy illustration does not now stand alone. Instead of one, we see many foot-prints, each in advance of and on a higher level than the print immediately behind it ; and, founding at once on an acquaintance with the past, extended throughout all the periods of the geologist, and on that instinct of our nature whose peculiar function it is to anticipate at least one creation more, we must regard the expectation of “a new heavens and new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness,” as not unphilosophic, but as, on the contrary, altogether rational, and fully according to experience.