

impressions and laws. In this application, the German philosophers have, up to the present time, rested upon this distinction a great part of the weight of their systems; as when Kant says, that Space and Time are the *Forms of Sensation*. Even in our own language, we retain a trace of the influence of this Aristotelian notion, in the word *Information*, when used for that knowledge which may be conceived as moulding the mind into a definite shape, instead of leaving it a mere mass of unimpressed susceptibility.

Another favorite Aristotelian antithesis is that of *Power* and *Act* (*δύναμις, ἐνέργεια*). This distinction is made the basis of most of the physical philosophy of the school; being, however, generally introduced with a peculiar limitation. Thus, Light is defined to be "the Act of what is lucid, as being lucid. And if," it is added, "the lucid be so in power but not in act, we have darkness." The reason of the limitation, "as being lucid," is, that a lucid body may act in other ways; thus a torch may move as well as shine, but its moving is not its act *as being a lucid* body.

Aristotle appears to be well satisfied with this explanation, for he goes on to say, "Thus light is not Fire, nor any body whatever, or the emanation of any body (for that would be a kind of body), but it is the presence of something like Fire in the body; it is, however, impossible that two bodies should exist in the same place, so that it is not a body;" and this reasoning appears to leave him more satisfied with his doctrine, that Light is an *Energy* or *Act*.

But we have a more distinctly technical form given to this notion. Aristotle introduced a word formed by himself, to express the act which is thus opposed to inactive power: this is the celebrated word *ἐντελέχεια*. Thus the noted definition of Motion in the third book of the *Physics*,²¹ is that it is "the *Entelechy*, or Act, of a movable body in respect of being movable;" and the definition of the Soul is²² that it is "the *Entelechy* of a natural body which has life by reason of its power." This word has been variously translated by the followers of Aristotle, and some of them have declared it untranslatable. *Act* and *Action* are held to be inadequate substitutes; the *very act, ipse cursus actionis*, is employed by some; *primus actus* is employed by many, but another school use *primus actus* of a non-operating form. Budæus uses *efficacia*. Cicero²³ translates it "quasi quandam continuatam motionem, et perennem;" but this paraphrase, though it may

²¹ *Phys.* iii. 1.

²² *De Animá*, ii. 1.

²³ *Tusc.* i. 10.