

and *Musa Cliffortiana* added to this impression. The weight which he had thus acquired, he proceeded to use for the improvement of botany. His *Fundamenta Botanica* and *Bibliotheca Botanica* appeared in 1736; his *Critica Botanica* and *Genera Plantarum* in 1737; his *Classes Plantarum* in 1738; his *Species Plantarum* was not published till 1753; and all these works appeared in many successive editions, materially modified.

This circulation of his works showed that his labors were producing their effect. His reputation grew; and he was soon enabled to exert a personal, as well as a literary, influence, on students of natural history. He became Botanist Royal, President of the Academy of Sciences at Stockholm, and Professor in the University of Upsal; and this office he held for thirty-six years with unrivalled credit; exercising, by means of his lectures, his constant publications, and his conversation, an extraordinary power over a multitude of zealous naturalists, belonging to every part of the world.

In order to understand more clearly the nature and effect of the reforms introduced by Linnæus into botany, I shall consider them under the four following heads;—*Terminology*, *Nomenclature*, *Artificial System*, and *Natural System*.

Sect. 2.—Linnæan Reform of Botanical Terminology.

It must be recollected that I designate as *Terminology*, the system of terms employed in the *description* of objects of natural history; while by *Nomenclature*, I mean the collection of the names of *species*. The reform of the descriptive part of botany was one of the tasks first attempted by Linnæus; and his terminology was the instrument by which his other improvements were effected.

Though most readers, probably, entertain, at first, a persuasion that a writer ought to content himself with the use of common words in their common sense, and feel a repugnance to technical terms and arbitrary rules of phraseology, as pedantic and troublesome; it is soon found, by the student of any branch of science that, without technical terms and fixed rules, there can be no certain or progressive knowledge. The loose and infantine grasp of common language cannot hold objects steadily enough for scientific examination, or lift them from one stage of generalization to another. They must be secured by the rigid mechanism of a scientific phraseology. This necessity had been felt in all the sciences, from the earliest periods of their progress. But the