idea of at least the general nature of the mechanism by which it seems now agreed, with hardly a dissentient voice, that the peculiar communication between distant objects which we call light is effected; and by which, or by *some* mechanism of a nature still more recondite, and at present perhaps beyond our conception of possibility, it must be so.

(4.) That we see, is proof of a communication of some sort between the eye and the thing seen. That we cannot see in the dark, is proof that such communication is not the mere act of the eye. And that one object is capable of impressing a photographic picture of itself on another, is proof that the eye, though essential to *seeing*, has nothing whatever to do with the process by which such communication is performed. And furthermore, the immense variety and extent of the chemical agencies of light as displayed in its action both on organic and on inorganic matter, revealed to us by the late discoveries in photography, assign to it a rank among natural agents of the highest and most universal character; and have even rendered it exceedingly probable, if they have not actually demonstrated, that vision itself is nothing but the mental perception of a chemical change wrought by its action on the material tissue of the retina of the eye.

(5.) At all events, it is not by any sympathy, or *absolute direct relation* between the eye and the object, that the latter is seen. The intermediate space, and indeed *all space*, is concerned in the process. An object is not seen unless it be in a certain state, which we call "lumin-