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always succeed, and requires a peculiar adjustment of the light, and of the comparative illumination of the objects and the ground on which it is seen projected, and perhaps also a peculiar state of nerve ; but when it does succeed, the effect is exceedingly singular and anomalous.

(20.) It would lead me into too great a length of detail, and I may also add, into a labyrinth of metaphysical considerations, out of which I should find some difficulty of getting disentangled, if I were to go into a discussion on those points of connexion between our mental and our bodily organization which these facts seem to suggest. There is a very curious chapter in Stuart Mill's *Treatise on Logic*, devoted to the question whether we are quite sure that every event *has a cause*. He decides it, as every reasonable man must do, in favour of the universality of the proposition, but he is compelled to admit, as every one who considers it closely must, I think, equally do, that the phænomena of the human will stand in a very peculiar relation to that question ; and that granting volition to be a *cause* of action, and granting the entire *freedom* of our will and its complete *independence* to choose when a choice of lines of action is brought before us, there is still the question behind—What determines the will? To this question an answer must be found which will leave man a moral and responsible agent. To choose the right and to avoid the wrong, *as such*, must be left in his power, and a freedom and independence of choice as between these two grand lines of action must be left