

him, if we would not reduce him to a machine. So far then, and to this extent, I do not see how it is possible not to recognize an original *causation*, or at least one which it is morally, intellectually, and logically impossible *for us* to find an antecedent for by any power of merely human inquiry. But still there arises this other and further question—What determines the will in cases where a variety of modes of action exist; all, so far as we can see, equally open to choice? Mr Mill here refers us to the associative principle; and refers the moral position of the individual to the education or early discipline of this associating principle, by which it may be habituated to suggest right and virtuous courses of action among the many possible ones more readily, more powerfully, and more *suggestively* (if one may tautologize so far) than those of a contrary nature. It is very evident that with the greatest rectitude of intention, if a course of action the most conducive to the interests of good do not suggest itself, or be not suggested from without, the course actually adopted may be one less so. It is then to the suggestive principle, whatever that be, and however it may act, that we must look for much that is determinant and decisive of our volition when carried out into action, even when the choice has been made between right and wrong in the abstract; and the “way in which thoughts come into our minds” is part and parcel of the nature and mode of action of that principle—if it be not merely another form of words for the same thing. Of course this is a subject so obscure and so mysterious, that it is quite