

the origin of force, we find it connected (possibly by intermediate links untraceable by our faculties, but yet indisputably *connected*) with volition, and by inevitable consequence, with *motive*, with *intellect*, and with all those attributes of mind in which—and not in the possession of arms, legs, brains, and viscera—personality consists. In limiting thus the domain of physical theory, we keep on the outside of the apparently interminable discussions and difficulties as to the origin of the will itself, which seem to have culminated in some minds in the denial of volition as a matter of fact, and in the dictum of Judge Carleton,* that what men term *the will*, is “simply a passive capacity to receive pleasure from whatever affects us agreeably at the time.”

(3.) It may, however, be said, and indeed there are not wanting those who appear very much disposed to say, if not *totidem verbis*, at least by strong implication, that the conception of *Force* itself, as part and parcel of the system of the material universe, is superfluous and therefore illògical. They argue thus. All we know of material phænomena, it is true, resolves itself into the transference of motion from matter to matter. This, however, may be effected by mere collision. Now, when A strikes B, and motion is thereby communicated from A to B, why not at once *admit this as a sequence*? Why interpose an unknown agent, or intermedium, Force, as part of the process? Having come to regard Heat, Light, Electricity, and the “imponderables” generally,

* “Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society,” ix. p. 136—Report of Meeting of January 2, 1863.