

of notice, that the three French Revolutions have in reality all turned on one pivot, and that some of the shrewdest of our contemporaries have been led egregiously into error in their calculations on the present occasion, simply by losing sight of it. Nay, a similar disregard of this hinging point, and of its controlling principle, seems to have been the fatal error of Louis Philippe himself. "It will require a most extraordinary and unforeseen combination of circumstances," said the *Times*, in an article on the Parisian outburst, "before any Government supported by an army of 100,000 men, under the command of Marshal Bugeaud, quartered with great skill in the outskirts of Paris, perfectly prepared for action, and backed by eighteen fortresses, will be compelled to capitulate to a popular insurrection. We suspect, however, it will turn out that no serious popular insurrection is even probable. The people have been stirred, but not inflamed. They are shaken, but not irritated; they are unarmed, and no preparation for insurrection had been made. Under such circumstances the result is certain. But if lives are lost in this miserable brawl, the reckoning will be heavy, not only on those who inconsiderately commenced an agitation which they had no power to bring to a successful termination, but on those whose obstinate resistance to a well-founded demand rendered such an appeal to the populace successful." Such were the anticipations of the *Times*; and not a few of our other contemporaries followed in its wake. Had they taken into account in their calculations the principle to which we refer,—a principle first pointed out at a time when there had been but *one* French Revolution from which the necessary data could be derived,—they would have reckoned less securely on the hundred thousand soldiers and the eighteen fortresses. France is emphatically the great military nation of Europe. But though it possesses what are in reality the sinews of war, *i. e.* great military ardour and