

many people,—for to regard money as such is an idle unsolidity, which, while it has the disadvantage of being commonplace, wants the balancing advantage of being true,—while France possesses, we say, a warlike people, it is wanting now, as in the days of Napoleon, and at every former period of its history, in the wealth necessary to *purchase* their service. Its rulers, therefore, in order to raise those great armies on which the power and character of the nation depend, must always appeal to its warlike sympathies; and the armies thus formed are, in consequence, what armies, in at least the same degree, are nowhere else in Europe,—merely armed portions of the people,—most formidable, as all modern history has shown, for purposes of foreign aggression, but in the hands of a despot, unless like Napoleon, the idol of the soldiery, dangerous chiefly to himself. This apparently simple, but in reality profound principle, on which all the French Revolutions have hinged, and which Louis Philippe, untaught by experience, so entirely forgot, was enunciated for the first time by Sir James Mackintosh, when the seventy thousand soldiers brought by Louis XVI. to invest the “Legislature and capital of France, felt that they were citizens, and the fabric of despotism fell to the ground.” “It was the apprehension of Montesquieu,” said the philosopher, “that the spirit of increasing armies would terminate in converting Europe into an immense camp, in changing our artizans and cultivators into military savages, and reviving the age of Attila and Genghis. Events are our preceptors, and France has taught us that this evil contains in itself its own remedy and limit. A domestic army cannot be increased without increasing the number of its ties with the people, and of the channels by which popular sentiment may enter it. Every man that is added to the army is a new link that unites it to the nation. If all citizens were compelled to become soldiers, all soldiers must of necessity adopt the feelings of citi-