

to acquiesce in the cause which he assigns for it. Pursuits not more profitable than metaphysical ones have been eminently popular in the age just gone by, and are so still. We know not that we should instance theology, seeing that on theological truth man's most important interests may be regarded as suspended; but we surely may instance that department of philosophic criticism in which Jeffrey himself won his laurels. We may instance, besides, at least two of the natural sciences,—astronomy and geology,—neither of them more rich of dowry than metaphysical science itself, and which cannot be advantageously prosecuted, save at a much greater expense. And yet both have been zealously cultivated, especially the latter, in the age during which metaphysics have been neglected. We must look for some other cause; nor do we think it ought to be difficult to find. Metaphysical pursuit fell into abeyance in this country, not because it rested on a mere basis of observation, not experiment, or because it led to no such tangible results as the pursuit of the physical sciences; but simply in consequence of a thorough divorce which took place, through the labours of some of the most acute and ingenious metaphysicians the world ever saw, between the deductions of the science and the conclusions of common sense. Reid, who raised one of the most vigorous protests ever made on the other side, has well remarked that "it is genius, and not the want of it, that adulterates philosophy, and fills it with error and false theory." And certainly none but very superior men could have run their science so high and dry upon the beach, that, with all the interest which attaches to its objects, men have preferred leaving it there, to taking the trouble of getting it afloat again. We have before us Brown's "Philosophy of the Human Mind," open at one of the most ingenious portions of the work,—that on the phenomena of simple suggestion; and would cite one of his views by way of example.