

of expansion or solidity. Redness, heat, expansion, and the idea of solidity, are all impressions of sentient existence,—accidents or qualities to be seen, felt, or conceived of. But it does not follow, that because a heated bar of iron is not conscious of heat, solidity, or redness, it is not therefore a heated bar of iron; or that because the senses can testify to its existence only as the senses of the living can testify of the existence of what is non-vital and non-sentient, it has therefore no existence as a non-vital, non-sentient substance. The leap in the logic seems most extraordinary, from the fact of the non-sentient character of the heated bar, to the non-existence of the heated bar. And yet, such virtually was the conclusion of Berkeley. “Some truths are so near and obvious to the mind,” he said, “that a man need only open his eyes to see them. And such,” he added, “I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of earth,—in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty framework of the world,—have not any substance without a mind; that their being is to be perceived or known: to be convinced of which, the reader need only reflect and try to separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.” In this last sentence the sophism seems to lie. It confounds conceiving with existing, light with eye and the optic nerve, and caloric and solidity with feeling and the tactile sense. It would date the beginning of the sun, not from that early period during which the sun influenced the yearly motions of our planet, but from the long posterior period during which eyes began to exist. And such essentially is the philosophy of that other ingenious metaphysician of our own time to which we refer. “He” also “goes so far as to affirm,” says Mr Cairns, in his admirable pamphlet, “that thought and existence are identical. Knowledge of existence, he says,—the apprehension of one’s self and other things,—is alone true existence.” Yes, true