

thing preternatural in man, but simply by his placing himself in alliance with certain natural powers and agencies, and by their means attaining dominion over the rest.

Here there rises before us a spectre which science and philosophy appear afraid to face, and which asks the dread question,—What is the cause of the apparent abnormality in the relations of man and nature? In attempting to solve this question, we must admit that the position of man, even here, is not without natural analogies. The stronger preys upon the weaker, the lower form gives place to the higher, and in the progress of geological time old species have died out in favour of newer, and old forms of life have been exterminated by later successors. Man, as the newest and highest of all, has thus the natural right to subdue and rule the world. Yet there can be little doubt that he uses this right unwisely and cruelly, and these terms themselves explain why he does so, because they imply freedom of will. Given a system of nature destitute of any being higher than the instinctive animal, and introduce into it a free rational agent, and you have at once an element of instability. So long as his free thought and purpose continue in harmony with the arrangements of his environment, so long all will be harmonious; but the very hypothesis of freedom implies that he can act otherwise, and so perfect is the equilibrium of existing things, that one wrong or unwise action may unsettle the nice balance, and set in operation trains of causes and effects producing continued and ever-increasing disturbance. Thus the most primitive state of man, though destitute of all mechanical inventions, may have been better in relation to the other parts of nature than any that he has subsequently attained to. His “many inventions” have injured him in his natural relations. This “fall of man” we know as a matter of observation and experience has actually occurred, and it can be retrieved only by casting man back again into