

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

the first to introduce the title of *metazoa*, and oppose these multicellular, tissue-forming animals to the unicellular *protozoa* (infusoria, rhizopods, etc.), and as I was the first to point out the essential difference in the development of the two (the former from germinal layers, and the latter not), I must protest that I consider the *protozoa* to be just as mortal in the physiological (and psychological) sense as the *metazoa*; neither body nor soul is immortal in either group. The other erroneous consequences of Weismann's notion have been refuted by Moebius (1884), who justly remarks that "every event in the world is periodic," and that "there is no source from which immortal organic individuals might have sprung."

When we take the idea of immortality in the widest sense, and extend it to the totality of the knowable universe, it has a scientific significance; it is then not merely acceptable, but self-evident, to the monistic philosopher. In that sense the thesis of the indestructibility and eternal duration of all that exists is equivalent to our supreme law of nature, the *law of substance* (see chap. xii.). As we intend to discuss this immortality of the cosmos fully later on, in establishing the theory of the persistence of matter and force, we shall not dilate on it at present. We pass on immediately to the criticism of that belief in immortality which is the only sense usually attached to the word, the immortality of the individual soul. We shall first inquire into the extent and the origin of this mystic and dualistic notion, and point out, in particular, the wide acceptance of the contradictory thesis, our monistic, empirically established *thanatism*. I must distinguish two essentially different forms of thanatism—primary and secondary; primary thanatism is the