

beyond those over which his jurisdiction extends.

First as to the "law of substance," by which he sets so much store ; the fact which he is really, though indistinctly, trying to emphasise, is what I have preferred to formulate as "the persistence of the really existent," see page 34 ; and, with that modification, we can agree with Haeckel, or with what I take to be his inner meaning, to some extent. We may all fairly agree, I think, that whatever really and fundamentally *exists* must, so far as bare existence is concerned, be independent of time. It may go through many changes, and thus have a history ; that is to say, must have definite time-relations, so far as its changes are concerned ; but it can hardly be thought of as either going out of existence, or as coming into existence, at any given period, though it may completely change its form and accidents ; everything basal must have a past and a future of some kind or other, though any special concatenation or arrange-